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The Rise in Personal Bankruptcies:
The Eighth Federal Reserve District and Beyond
Thomas A. Garrett
Personal bankruptcy filings in the United States increased, per capita, nearly 350 percent between
1980 and 2005. This paper first addresses the changes in economic and institutional factors that
have occurred over the past 100 years, many of which have occurred in the past 30 years, which
are likely contributors to the dramatic rise in personal bankruptcy filings seen across the country.
These factors include a reduction in personal savings, an increase in consumer debt, the prolifera-
tion of revolving credit, changes to bankruptcy law, and a reduced social stigma associated with
filing for bankruptcy. Given the availability of bankruptcy data at various levels of aggregation,
the remaining sections of the paper contain results from several different empirical analyses of
bankruptcy filings using various data sets. Careful attention is paid to personal bankruptcy filings
in counties located in Eighth Federal Reserve District states. (JEL D14, K35, G33)
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per 1,000 persons.2 Shelby County in Tennessee
(Memphis area) led the nation in personal bank-
ruptcy filings, with a rate of over 20 filings per
1,000 persons, or 2 percent of the population of
Shelby County. At the other end of the spectrum,
Massachusetts had a filing rate of 2.8 filings per
1,000 persons, ranking last of all states.
So what is behind this rapid increase in bank-
ruptcy filings? The general cause of most personal
bankruptcy filings is no mystery: An individual
has too much debt and often also experiences an
unexpected negative shock to his or her income,
such as divorce, unemployment, or an uncovered
medical expense. But this does not explain the
increase in personal bankruptcy filings that has
occurred over the past 100 years, nor does it
explain the explosive growth in bankruptcy filings
over the past 30 years.
The first part of the paper will discuss changes
in several economic and institutional factors that
are likely contributors to the dramatic rise in per-
sonal bankruptcy filings seen across the country.
P
ersonal bankruptcy filings in the
United States have soared over the
past 30 years, from 1.2 per 1,000 per-
sons in 1980 to nearly 5.4 per 1,000
persons in 2005, an increase of nearly 350 per-
cent. Over this period, bankruptcies have been
growing at an average annual rate of nearly 7
percent, about 1.5 times greater than the average
rate of annual per capita gross domestic product
(GDP) growth. Taking a longer perspective, the
2005 filing rate of 5.4 per 1,000 persons is nearly
80 times greater than the 1920 rate of 0.06 filings
per 1,000 persons.1
These statistics disguise the fact that personal
bankruptcy filings are not equal across the country.
For example, at the state level, Tennessee has
usually had the highest rate of personal bank-
ruptcy filings in the nation, with over 10 filings
1 Bankruptcy data are from the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts: www.uscourts.gov/adminoff.html.
2 Tennessee ranked third in personal bankruptcies in 2005—bank-
ruptcies per 1,000 persons were greater in Indiana and Ohio in 2005.
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the causes of increased bankruptcy filings and
may thus lead to a better understanding of the
solutions to reverse this trend.
The availability of bankruptcy data at various
levels of aggregation—that is, national, state, and
local—affords us the opportunity to conduct tem-
poral and cross-sectional analyses of bankruptcy
filings at these different levels of aggregation. The
remaining section of the paper will present and
discuss the results from several different empirical
analyses of bankruptcy filings using various data
sets. Analysis at the national level will explore the
long-run versus short-run relationship between
bankruptcy filings and several key economic vari-
ables, such as the savings rate, consumer debt, and
income. An analysis of state-level personal bank-
ruptcy filings reveals that bankruptcy filing rates
have been converging over time. That is, states
having had higher personal bankruptcy filings are
found to have had lower rates of growth in bank-
ruptcy filings. Finally, analysis at the county level
uses data for all counties in Eighth Federal Reserve
District states. The county analysis explores the
relationship of personal bankruptcy filings with
income and the distribution of income.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the
authority to legislate bankruptcy. Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution reads “The Congress
shall have Power To establish…uniform Laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.” Despite this Constitutional authority, no
permanent bankruptcy law existed in the United
States for the first 120 years after this country’s
founding.3
Three federal bankruptcy acts were passed—
in 1800, 1841, and 1867—but all were repealed
shortly after their enactment for several reasons.
First, during the late 1700s and most of the 1800s,
the demand for bankruptcy legislation by debtors
and creditors increased during recessionary
periods and diminished during boom periods.
Second, strong political divides in Congress
between Whigs and Federalists (Republicans),
who were pro-creditor, and Democrats, who were
pro-debtor, prevented the permanency of any
legislation. Third, the process of filing for bank-
ruptcy under each of the three acts was far from
easy—a costly administrative structure was in
place and all bankruptcy filings had to be done
in one of the relatively small number of federal
courts across the country.
The first long-lasting piece of bankruptcy
legislation in the United States was the 1898
Bankruptcy Act. The 1898 Act was designed to
aid creditors in the liquidation of an individual’s
assets and reorganize insolvent corporations. At
the time of the 1898 Act, corporate bankruptcies
accounted for the vast majority of all bankruptcy
filings. Unlike the earlier acts of 1800, 1841, and
1867, the permanency of the 1898 Act was due to
(i) a unified Congress and presidency (Republican)
and (ii) the rapid growth and political strength
of special interest groups (pro-debtor and pro-
creditor) that culminated in the late 1800s. The
rise of populism through the 1800s contributed
to a strong political demand for pro-debtor bank-
ruptcy legislation. On the other hand, the growth
in business and industry over this same time
period resulted in the rise of pro-business interest
groups such as chambers of commerce and com-
mercial trade groups. Competition between these
growing interest groups placed great political pres-
sures on Congress to pass long-lasting bankruptcy
legislation. The 1898 Act also fostered the growth
of professional bankruptcy groups that had tremen-
dous political influence, such as the American
Bar Association and Community Law League.
The Great Depression in the 1930s revealed
several problems with the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.4
First, the percentage of voluntary personal bank-
ruptcy filings grew at this time. The 1898 Act,
while containing some provisions for personal
bankruptcy filing, mostly addressed the issue of
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3 A detailed history of bankruptcy legislation in the United States
can be found in Skeel (2001) and
www.princeton.edu/~pefinmar/Hansen.pdf.
4 See http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/hansen.bankruptcy.law.us.corporate bankruptcy. Second, the 1898 Act stipu-
lated that all corporations that filed for bankruptcy
be placed in corporate receivership.5 Increased
business bankruptcies during the Great Depression
revealed several problems, including corruption,
with the structure of corporate receivership
established under the 1898 Act.
The Chandler Act of 1938 was designed to
remedy weaknesses of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.
Many more provisions for individual and corpo-
rate debtors were contained in the Chandler Act.
For example, it allowed debtors to choose between
liquidation and repayment of debt and also pro-
vided for voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy
filings. As with the 1898 Act, the impetus behind
the Chandler Act was the strong desire of various
special interest groups, such as the American Bar
Association, National Association of Credit
Management, and the Commercial Law League,
to change federal bankruptcy law.
The next significant piece of bankruptcy legis-
lation was the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
Between the 1930s and 1970s, corporate bank-
ruptcy filings decreased but personal bankruptcies
steadily increased. The 1978 Act (also known as
the “Bankruptcy Code”) replaced many earlier pro-
visions for voluntary personal bankruptcy estab-
lished by the 1898 Act. Individuals could chose
between Chapter 7 filing, which provided for the
liquidation of the debtor’s assets, or Chapter 13,
which allowed for the repayment and reorgani-
zation of a debtor’s assets.6 Many of the changes
to Chapter 13 made bankruptcy a more attractive
option to debtors than in the past, and it is argued
by some that the 1978 Act caused, at least in part,
the increase in bankruptcy filings immediately
following implementation of the Act.7
Additional changes to the 1978 Act were made
by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, such as
expediting the procedures for personal and cor-
porate bankruptcy filings and increasing the per-
centage of a debtor’s assets that are exempt from
creditors (called the homestead exemption).
President George W. Bush signed the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 into law on April 20, 2005,
with the Act taking effect on October 17, 2005.
The Act was designed to reduce the number of
personal bankruptcy filings that have continued
to increase since the late 1970s, by increasing the
cost of filings for personal bankruptcy.8 Specifi-
cally, the 2005 Act introduces two needs-based
tests (based on income) for Chapter 7 filings (liq-
uidations), requires filers to participate in credit
counseling, and increases the allowable time
between Chapter 7 filings to 8 years. The Act also
established several requirements for lenders, such
as better disclosure regarding minimum payments,
interest rates (on credit cards), late payment dead-
lines, and introductory rates. The 2005 Act was
seen by consumers as increasing the costs of filing
for bankruptcy; consequently, filing rates
increased dramatically (nearly six times higher
than average) prior to the Act’s effective date, as
seen in Figure 1. Note that after October 2005,
bankruptcy filings were lower than the previous
two-year average. Discussions with various bank-
ruptcy professionals reveal, however, that personal
bankruptcy filings are again on the rise.
THE BANKRUPTCY BOOM:
CITED CULPRITS
The primary cause of personal bankruptcy is
a high level of consumer debt often coupled with
an unexpected insolvency event, such as the loss
of a job, a major medical expense not covered by
insurance, divorce, or death of a spouse (Gropp,
Scholz, and White, 1997; Buckley and Brinig,
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5 A receiver is a person or company appointed to manage a corpo-
ration during its reorganization.
6 See Nelson (1999) on consumers’ choice between filing Chapter 7
or Chapter 13.
7 See Shepard (1984a). Several features of the 1978 Act made filing
for bankruptcy relatively more attractive than in the past: (i) federal
exemption levels were increased, (ii) the requirement that creditors
must approve the repayment plan under Chapter 13 was removed,
(iii) Chapter 13 provided for the discharge of some debts that could
not be discharged under Chapter 7, and (iv) eligibility for Chapter
13 was expanded, thus allowing almost all individuals protection
from creditors under Chapter 7.
8 The 2005 Act can be found at www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcy-
courts/abuseprotection.pdf. Various legal professionals in St.
Louis and Memphis have commented to the author that the 2005
Act has many loopholes that result in minimal additional costs to
consumers relative to earlier bankruptcy laws.Garrett
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U.S. Consumer Saving and Debt as a Percentage of Income: Quarterly, 1980 to 20051998; and Nelson, 1999). Lower- to middle-income
individuals are more likely to file for bankruptcy
in response to an insolvency event, given their
relatively limited access to financial counseling
and fewer and less-diversified financial resources.
According to consumer economists’ surveys, the
typical bankruptcy filer is a blue collar, high
school graduate who is the head of a household
in the lower-middle income class, with heavy use
of credit.9 But, as mentioned earlier, this descrip-
tion of the average bankruptcy filer cannot by itself
explain the rapid increase in personal bankruptcy
filings that has occurred over the past 30 years.
It is unlikely that one event triggered the rise
in bankruptcy filings. Rather, various economic
and institutional changes have occurred that are
likely contributors. Many of the changes discussed
in this paper, such as the increased availability
of credit, lower costs to filing for bankruptcy,
decreased consumer savings, and increased con-
sumer debt, do not necessarily cause bankruptcies,
per se, but rather have made individuals more
susceptible to negative income shocks, thus
increasing the chance of bankruptcy.
Economic Factors
Personal bankruptcy filings per 1,000 persons
in the United States from 1900 to 2005 are shown
in Figure 2.10 Bankruptcy filings were relatively
low and steady from about 1900 to 1920. Filings
then increased slightly during the 1920s and
1930s. World War II saw a marked drop in filings,
likely the result of increased employment in sup-
port of the war effort. After the war, the number
of filings increased and continued to do so into the
1960s. Two reasons for this rise were an increase
in economic activity following World War II and
the rise in federal and state transfer programs such
as Medicare, welfare, and disability, which (i) may
have created an incentive for individuals to be
less financially responsible given the expanding
government safety net or (ii) is reflective of gen-
erally poorer financial decisionmaking by lower-
income individuals.11
Corresponding with the dramatic change in
bankruptcy filings since the early 1980s has been
a marked decrease in consumer savings. For
example, total saving as a percentage of income
averaged nearly 10 percent in 1980 compared
with 0.1 percent in the second quarter of 2005
(see Figure 3).12 Although rising property values
have likely led to a portfolio shift from traditional
savings to investing in one’s home, this latter
option offers much less diversity, and thus higher
risk, than traditional savings.
Consumer debt has increased dramatically
over the past 30 years. Consumer debt service,
which includes mortgage payments and personal
debt (including credit cards), as a percentage of
income increased from about 11 percent of per-
sonal income in 1980 to nearly 14 percent of
income in the second quarter of 2005, as seen in
Figure 3. Similarly, consumer financial obligations
(a broader measure than consumer debt) as a per-
centage of income have increased since 1980, as
seen in Figure 3.13 These statistics, combined with
the saving statistics, reveal that Americans have
been saving less and spending more (through debt)
over the past 30 years, thus making individuals
more susceptible to negative income shocks and
thus more likely to file for bankruptcy.
The simultaneous spread of casino gambling
and rising bankruptcy rates in the 1990s has been
9 Shepard (1984b).
10 Data prior to 1960 were obtained from Hansen and Hansen (2006);
for these years, it was assumed that “miscellaneous bankruptcies”
reported in Hansen and Hansen were 60 percent corporate and 40
percent personal.
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11 Visa USA, Inc. (1996) and Edmiston (2006).
12 The savings rate referred to here is the difference between dispos-
able personal income and current consumption divided by dispos-
able personal income. This measure of the savings rate is from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis’ National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA). This measure of savings is not without criticism.
For example, realized capital gains are excluded, whereas taxes
on realized capital gains are included. Also, pension benefits are
not included in personal income but contributions to pensions are
deducted from personal income. Another measure of the savings
rate is based on the flow of funds (FOF) by the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors. This measure computes savings as the change
in net wealth divided by disposable income. The FOF measure and
the NIPA measure are quite different. The FOF savings rate averaged
11.2 percent between 1954 and 2005, and the NIPA measure aver-
aged 6.9 percent over the same time period. Although producing
different estimates of the savings rate, the two measures are corre-
lated over time.
13 Financial obligations is a broader measure than consumer debt in
that it considers automobile payments, rental payments, home-
owners insurance, and property tax payments.noted and studied for evidence of a causal rela-
tionship. Research has provided mixed results.
The U.S. Treasury Department (1999), using data
from 1962 to 1998 and applying an intervention
model, found no measurable effect of gambling
on personal bankruptcy rates in Mississippi and
New Jersey. Expanding on the study performed by
the Treasury Department, de la Viña and Bernstein
(2002) examined county-level bankruptcy rates
for the years 1988 to 1996. The authors found no
relationship between casino gambling (available
within a 50-mile radius) and bankruptcy.
Thalheimer and Ali (2004) examined personal
bankruptcy rates over the period 1990 to 1997 in
the riverboat gambling states of Iowa, Illinois,
Missouri, and Mississippi. The authors found
that access to casino gambling had no significant
influence on personal bankruptcies. However, the
authors did estimate that personal bankruptcy
rates, on average, would have been 0.4 percent
lower in the absence of casino gambling.
Finally, Barron, Staten, and Wilshusen (2002)
found a small localized influence of casino gam-
bling on bankruptcy. Using county-level data for
the period 1993 to 1999, the authors found that
casino gambling had a positive and significant
influence on personal bankruptcy. They noted
that, without gambling, counties with or adjacent
to casinos would have had bankruptcy rates that
were 5.4 percent lower in 1998.
Institutional Factors
The rise in personal bankruptcies in the 1920s
and1930s,alongwithgrowingcorruptionandlegal
challenges regarding corporate bankruptcy filings
during the Great Depression, prompted passage
of the Chandler Act in 1938. The Chandler Act
created a host of new options for those filing for
personal bankruptcy, such as alternatives to com-
plete liquidation (e.g., a repayment plan) and a
greater ability to file voluntary petitions. The bank-
ruptcy reforms that resulted from the Chandler
Act made personal bankruptcy filing relatively
more attractive and less costly than in the past.
An increased availability of consumer credit,
especially in the form of credit cards, has occurred
since the 1950s.14 Although proprietary charge
cards were available in the early 1900s, the use
of these cards was traditionally limited to a single
store. Also, many of these cards did not have the
feature of revolving credit.15 The first general pur-
pose credit card (BankAmericard, now known as
Visa) was introduced in 1966. In 1970, only 16
percent of families had a credit card, compared
with 82 percent of families in 2000.
Table 1 shows statistics on credit card owner-
ship and balances, broken down into family
income categories for select years.16 The top por-
tion of the table reveals that credit card ownership
by all income groups has increased over time, but
that wealthier families are more likely to possess
a credit card. For example, in 1970, only 2 percent
of the lowest income families possessed a credit
card, compared with 47 percent in 2003. But, in
1970, 33 percent of the highest income families
possessed a credit card, compared with 99 percent
in 2003.
Not surprisingly, higher income groups tend
to have higher balances. However, the important
measure is balance as a percentage of income—
which reflects the burden of credit card debt. As
seen in Table 1, average credit card balances for
the lowest income families are a greater percent-
age of family income than balances for wealthier
families. In 1970, for example, credit card balances
were about 5 percent of income for the lowest
income families and less than 1 percent of income
for the highest income families. In 2003, credit
card balances were nearly 12 percent of income
for the lowest income families and roughly 8.5
percent of income for the highest income families.
Although wealthier families are more likely to
have a credit card than lower income families,
their balances are a smaller percentage of their
income.
14 Sienkiewicz (2001).
15 Revolving credit is an agreement to lend a specific amount to a
borrower and to allow that amount to be borrowed again once it
has been repaid.
16 Data prior to 2003 were obtained from Durkin (2000). Data for 2003
were computed using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances
(2004). “Lowest” is the upper range of the first quartile (about
$25,000 in 2004), “middle” is the upper range of the third quartile
(about $66,000 in 2004), and “highest” is the lowest range of the
top 5 percent (about $174,000 in 2004). See www.census.gov/hhes/
www/income/histinc/f01ar.html for a description of the family
income distribution data.
Garrett
20 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2007 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEWThe late 1970s saw numerous legal changes
that likely had an impact on bankruptcy filings.
First, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
revamped bankruptcy practices set forth under
the 1898 Act and the Chandler Act. Although the
1978 Act was passed in response to the rise in
personal bankruptcies during the 1960s, many
provisions in the Act made it easier for both busi-
nesses and individuals to file for bankruptcy.
Academic research on the effect of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 on subsequent bankruptcy
filings is mixed, however (Shepard, 1984a; and
Domowitz and Eovaldi, 1993).
A second legal change in the late 1970s was
a Supreme Court ruling in 1978 called the
Marquette decision.17 Prior to this time, many
states had usury ceilings on credit card interest
rates. The high inflation and interest rates of the
late 1970s significantly reduced the earnings of
credit card companies. As a result, credit card
companies in states with relatively high interest
rate ceilings attempted to solicit their credit cards
to people living in states with lower interest rate
ceilings—and still charge the higher interest rates.
Controversy over this practice culminated in
the Supreme Court, which ruled that lenders in
states with high interest rate ceilings could export
those high rates to consumers residing in states
with more restrictive interest rate ceilings. The
result of this ruling was an expansion of credit
card availability and a reduction in the average
credit quality of card holders.
The third legal change in the late 1970s was
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which
was enacted in 1977 to encourage depository insti-
tutions to help meet the credit and financing needs
of the community, especially low- to moderate-
Garrett
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17 The actual case is Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v.
First of Omaha Service Corp. See Ellis (1998) for a discussion.
Table 1
Credit Card Usage and Balance by Family Income
Income Level
Lowest Middle Highest
Percent of families with a credit card
1970 2 14 33
1989 17 62 89
1998 28 72 95
2003 47 91 99
Mean credit card balance ($)*
1970 1,038 950 882
1989 909 2,502 3,960
1998 2,596 4,785 6,063
2003 2,938 6,077 14,713
Mean balance as a percent of family income
1970 4.8 2.0 0.9
1989 3.9 4.2 2.7
1998 10.4 7.4 3.6
2003 11.9 9.1 8.4
NOTE: *Dollar values are in 2004 dollars (adjusted for inflation).
SOURCE: See text for data sources. Income data for each group are from the U.S. Census. Income data are available at
www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/f01ar.html.income communities.18 Because the Act has
increased credit flows to disadvantaged commu-
nities, it is possible that it also has increased the
number of bankruptcy filings by lower income
individuals. Research has suggested that the num-
ber of bankruptcies that result from CRA loans is,
at most, 3 to 4 percent of overall bankruptcy
filings.19
Although some minor legal changes to the
Bankruptcy Code did occur in the 1980s, the next
significant change was the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994. Each state has laws regarding the
percentage of an individual’s various assets that
are exempt from creditors when that individual
files for bankruptcy. These assets include insur-
ance plans, pensions, personal property, and real
estate (the homestead exemption). The federal
government also sets exemption levels for these
assets, and individuals may choose between using
the federal exemption and their state’s exemption
(depending which is higher) if their state allows
such a choice.20 The 1994 Act increased federal
personal property exemption levels, which in
essence made it less costly for individuals to file
for bankruptcy because they could now keep a
greater percentage of their assets. Not surprisingly,
personal filings increased roughly 17 percent
between 1994 and 1995 in the states affected by
the higher federal exemptions.
In addition to the legal changes that have
occurred over the past several decades, another
potential contributor to the rise in bankruptcy
filings is the decrease in the social stigma associ-
ated with filing for bankruptcy. Although such a
measure is largely unquantifiable, it is not unrea-
sonable to suspect that filing for bankruptcy
becomes less undesirable as more people declare
bankruptcy. It is likely that the aforementioned
legal and economic changes were greater causes
of the initial rise in filings rates over the past 30
years, but the public’s view of personal bankruptcy
arguably would have become less negative as a
greater percentage of the population had filed for
bankruptcy.
This section has discussed the institutional
changes that are likely contributors to the rapid
increase in personal bankruptcy filings; the rise
in credit card usage and the relaxation of restric-
tions on interstate credit card provision; greater
availability of credit to lower income individuals;
decreased social stigma associated with bank-
ruptcy filings; and changes to bankruptcy law
that have made it less costly for individuals to
file for bankruptcy.
Empirically disentangling the effect of each of
the institutional changes on bankruptcy filings
is quite difficult, however. As seen in Figure 2,
there is a marked break in the trend level of bank-
ruptcy filings in the late 1970s and early 1980s—
the period of time that corresponds with many
of the legal changes that have been hypothesized
to increase the rate of bankruptcy filings. Bank-
ruptcy filings were regressed on a time trend for
two periods: 1900 to 2005 and 1978 to 2005. Not
surprisingly, empirical tests revealed that the
coefficient on the 1978 to 2005 time trend variable
was statistically greater than the coefficient on
the overall sample period.21 However, because
many of these events occurred around the same
period of time, it is difficult to determine the sep-
arate effects of each event on bankruptcy filings.
Thus, it remains unclear whether all changes have
had some effect on bankruptcy filings or the rapid





The rise in personal bankruptcies over the
past 30 years (Figure 2) was paralleled by an
21 The coefficient (standard error) on Trend1900-2005 = 0.0086 (0.0012),
and the coefficient (standard error) on Trend1978-2005 = 0.164 (0.0047).
22 The empirical work done on the issue of personal bankruptcy is
quite extensive. See, e.g., Fisher (2004, 2005), Filer and Fisher
(2005), Fan and White (2003), and Nelson (1999).
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18 See www.stlouisfed.org/community/about_cra.html for a discussion
of the Community Reinvestment Act.
19 See Gramlich (1999):
www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/speeches/1999/19990616.htm.
20 The following states allow debtors to select the federal or state
exemptions: AR, CT, HI, MA, MI, MN, NJ, NM, PA, RI, SC, TX,
VT, WA, WI. See www.Bankruptcyinformation.com for detailed
information on each state’s bankruptcy law and exemptions.increase in consumer debt and a decrease in con-
sumer savings (Figure 3). An interesting question
is whether changes in the economic variables
from one period to another can explain changes
in bankruptcy filing rates. In other words, there
appears to be a long-run relationship between
bankruptcy filings and the various economic
variables (Figures 2 and 3), but one cannot tell
whether short-run changes in the economic vari-
ables influence short-run changes in bankruptcy
filing rates.
Before considering the relationship between
changes in bankruptcy and changes in these
variables, however, it is useful to understand the
pattern of personal bankruptcy changes quarter
to quarter. Percent changes in quarterly U.S. bank-
ruptcy filing rates from 1980 to 2005 are shown
in Figure 4.
Figure 4 reveals two interesting points. First,
the majority of the changes are positive rather than
negative, thus showing that since 1980 there has
been, overall, positive quarterly growth in bank-
ruptcy filings. Second, quarterly filing rates
increased dramatically at the start of three reces-
sions (1980, 1990-1991, and 2001) and actually
decreased in the following quarter for the latter
two recessions. This suggests that the past two
recessions served as housecleaning events of
sorts—individuals teetering on the edge of bank-
ruptcy immediately prior to each recession were
pushed into bankruptcy from job losses, unem-
ployment, and other setbacks resulting from the
recession. After these individuals filed for bank-
ruptcy, the number of individuals filing for bank-
ruptcy was initially lower, as reflected by the
negative growth in filing rates.
The following analysis attempts to answer the
question of whether quarterly percent changes
in personal bankruptcy filings are influenced by
quarterly percent changes in per capita income,
employment, the savings rate, health coverage,
and debt as a percentage of income. Changes in
these variables represent shocks to each variable.
The data shown in Figure 4 are used for the analy-
sis (1980:Q3 to 2004:Q4). The empirical model is
(1) Bankruptcyt = Xt β βk + Xt–1α αk + e,
where Bankruptcyt is the percentage change in
U.S. personal bankruptcy filings per 1,000 persons
in quarter t. The matrix Xt contains the quarterly
percentage change in per capita income, payroll
employment, savings as a percent of disposable
income, the percent of the population covered by
private/public health insurance, and consumer
debt as a percentage of personal income.23 The
one-period lag of each variable is included in
matrix Xt–1 to account for the possible lagged
effect of each variable on bankruptcy filings.
Recessions may proxy for negative income
shocks. Different stages of a recession may also
have different effects on bankruptcy filings, as
seen in Figure 4 by the large positive change and
subsequent negative change occurring during
recessions. Three dummy variables are included
in the empirical model to capture the effects of
recession stages on bankruptcies. (National Bureau
of Economic Research recession dates are used.)
The first variable takes a value of 1 for the first
quarter of a recession and 0 otherwise. The second
variable takes a value of 1 for the second quarter
of a recession and 0 otherwise. Finally, the third
variable takes a value of 1 for the third and all
remaining quarters of a recession and 0 otherwise.
Each dummy variable will reflect the average
change in bankruptcy filings for the respective
recession quarter relative to non-recession
quarters.
Coefficient estimates from equation (1) are
shown in Table 2. None of the continuous vari-
ables has a significant effect on changes in per-
sonal bankruptcy filings. The first and second
quarters of a recession, however, are found to
have a statistically significant effect. Specifically,
Garrett
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23 Data sources: Personal bankruptcy filings are from the Administra-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts, per capita income and savings as a
percent of income are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, pay-
roll employment is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, consumer
debt as a percentage of income is from the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors, and the percent of the population with public/private
health insurance is from the Source Book of Health Insurance Data
(for the years 1980 to 1987) and the U.S. Bureau of the Census (for
the years 1988 to present). Although bankruptcy data are available
through the second quarter of 2005, these data were not used
because the passage of the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act was signed in April. It was thought the
bankruptcy data for the first two quarters of 2005 would in part
reflect action on the part of consumers to file before the Act took
place.the estimates suggest that the average change in
bankruptcy filings is 14.9 percentage points higher
during the first quarter of a recession compared
with a non-recession quarter. In the second quarter
of a recession, however, bankruptcy filings are
9.2 percentage points lower than during non-
recession quarters. The first quarter and second
quarter recession dummy coefficients suggest a
net positive effect of recessions on bankruptcy
filing rates of 5.7 percentage points (14.9 – 9.2).24
To test whether the first quarter and second
quarter recession dummy coefficients are statis-
tically different in magnitude, an F-test was
conducted on the null hypothesis that the two
coefficients sum to zero. The F-statistic from this
test is 0.764, with a p-value of 0.39. Thus, the net
effect of the first two quarters of a recession on
the percentage change in bankruptcy filings is
not statistically different from zero. The positive
increase during the first quarter of a recession is
offset by a decrease of a statistically similar mag-
nitude during the second quarter of a recession.
One study by VISA that also used national data
(1980 to 1996) to empirically model bankruptcy
filings found that lagged changes in employment
“proved to have the single most powerful coeffi-
cient in explaining bankruptcy behavior.”25 The
Visa study did not consider the separate effects
of recession in its empirical models. To explore
whether the recession variable in equation (1) is
dampening the effects of employment changes,
model (1) was re-estimated without the recession
dummy variables. The estimated effects of employ-
ment on bankruptcy filings still remained statis-
tically insignificant, but less so than when the
recession variables were included.
The main conclusion from the national analy-
sis presented here is that recessions (a good proxy
for a negative income shock) can have significant
effects (both positive and negative) on the short-
term growth in national bankruptcy filings.
Specifically, the results showed that bankruptcies
increase dramatically at the start of a recession
but tend to fall in the second quarter of a reces-
sion. At least for the sample period studied here,
recessions serve as temporary disruptions to the
trend rate of growth in personal bankruptcy filings.
However, the first quarter increase and second
quarter decrease are not statistically different in
magnitude, so the net effect of an entire recession
on bankruptcy filings is no different from that
which occurs in non-recession quarters.
State-Level Statistics
Descriptive statistics on state-level bankruptcy
filings and bankruptcy filing growth rates for
Garrett














U.S. Personal Bankruptcies: Quarterly Percent Changes, 1980 to 2005
24 The null hypothesis that the first quarter and second quarter reces-
sion coefficients are the same can be rejected at the 1 percent level
(F-statistic = 20.09).
25 See Visa USA, Inc. (1996).selected years from 1980 to 2005 are shown in
Table 3.
The data reveal that average state filings per
1,000 persons increased from about 1.2 in 1980,
to 5.3 in 2004, and to 6.9 in 2005. This 30 percent
increase from 2004 to 2005 is, in large part, due to
the increase in filings prior to the 2005 Bankruptcy
Act (see Figure 1). One should keep in mind, how-
ever, that the statistics for 2005 may not represent
any long-term changes from prior years if the
large increase in filings prompted by the 2005
Bankruptcy Act is temporary.
The data in Table 3 reveal some interesting
facts about bankruptcy filings in Eighth District
states. From 1980 to 2005, bankruptcy filing rates
in Eighth District states were, in most cases, in the
top half to top one-third of all states. Tennessee
typically has had the highest filing rate in the
nation, but the state was surpassed by Indiana
(rank of 1) and Ohio (rank of 2) in 2005. Arkansas
experienced the greatest increase in rank, moving
from 27 in 1980 to 5 in 2005, whereas Illinois
had a rank of 6 in 1980 and a rank of 16 in 2005.
Kentucky’s ranking of 11 in 2004 remained fairly
consistent over the past 25 years, including 2005.
Missouri’s rank has worsened over time, moving
from a rank of 21 in 1980 to a rank of 11 in 2005.
Mississippi, which has typically ranked in the
top 10, moved from a rank of 9 in 2004 to a rank
of 19 in 2005.
In 1980, Arkansas was the only Eighth District
state to have had a filing rate (0.99) that was lower
than the U.S. state average of 1.18. In 2004 and
2005, all Eighth District states had filing rates
greater than the U.S. state average (5.34 and 6.38,
respectively). In 2004, Tennessee was the only
Garrett
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Table 2
Effect of Economic Variables on Bankruptcy Growth Rates
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic
Constant 0.020 1.20
Per capita income –0.030 0.02
Savings as % of income –0.002 0.15
Debt as % of income 0.393 0.25
Percent with health coverage –0.205 0.57
Payroll employment –5.027 1.36
Per capita income (t–1) –0.093 0.05
Savings as % of income (t–1) 0.013 0.92
Debt as % of income (t–1) 0.525 0.36
Percent with health coverage (t–1) –0.327 0.98
Payroll employment (t–1) 3.847 1.12
Recession, first quarter 0.149*** 3.72
Recession, second quarter –0.092** 2.07
Recession, third plus remaining quarter(s) –0.021 0.60
R2 0.164
Durbin-Watson 2.21
Number of observations 98
NOTE: */**/*** denote statistical significance at the 10/5/1 percent levels. Each recession variable is a dummy variable taking the
value of 1 for the respective quarter of a National Bureau of Economic Research–dated recession and 0 otherwise. The sample period
is 1980:Q3–2004:Q4. All continuous variables are in percent changes. The dependent variable is the percentage change in national
bankruptcy filings per 1,000 persons. See text for a description of each variable.Garrett






State 1980 1990 2004 2005 1980 2004 2005 1980-2004
Alaska 46 37 51 51 0.52 2.20 3.34 12.79
Alabama 232 6 2.38 9.20 10.42 11.46
Arkansas 27 22 45 0.99 8.69 10.85 31.17
Arizona 22 6 22 24 1.18 5.38 6.68 14.31
California 12 15 45 43 1.66 3.32 4.50 4.01
Colorado 11 5 20 10 1.67 5.95 9.04 10.23
Connecticut 42 43 47 45 0.59 3.23 4.31 17.96
Delaware 36 45 35 39 0.74 4.09 4.92 18.10
Florida 47 25 26 31 0.50 4.87 5.97 34.59
Georgia 926 12 1.78 8.51 8.74 15.13
Hawaii 41 51 50 50 0.59 2.43 3.46 12.49
Iowa 29 38 33 29 0.98 4.31 6.15 13.67
Idaho 8 12 12 17 1.78 6.69 8.28 10.99
Illinois 6 17 17 16 2.14 6.24 8.30 7.69
Indiana 595 1 2.18 8.66 12.47 11.87
Kansas 13 16 21 18 1.57 5.86 8.15 10.96
Kentucky 7 13 11 9 1.95 6.71 9.55 9.74
Louisiana 26 23 14 20 1.01 6.48 7.96 21.59
Massachusetts 48 46 48 47 0.46 2.83 4.11 20.61
Maryland 33 34 24 27 0.84 5.22 6.18 20.77
Maine 38 49 44 40 0.66 3.32 4.90 16.08
Michigan 19 30 16 13 1.37 6.29 8.73 14.37
Minnesota 30 18 46 42 0.96 3.26 4.69 9.62
Missouri 21 24 15 11 1.31 6.47 8.98 15.77
Mississippi 10 89 19 1.75 7.24 8.04 12.52
Montana 25 29 32 28 1.07 4.56 6.17 12.99
North Carolina 23 39 34 41 1.15 4.23 4.88 10.67
North Dakota 44 47 41 35 0.55 3.46 5.41 20.96
Nebraska 16 27 25 23 1.50 5.03 6.72 9.41
New Hampshire 40 33 42 46 0.61 3.46 4.21 18.51
New Jersey 39 35 30 33 0.63 4.67 5.60 25.75
New Mexico 28 26 31 30 0.98 4.62 6.01 14.82
Nevada 34 10 7 2.30 7.14 9.71 8.41
New York 24 40 37 34 1.07 3.94 5.58 10.66
Ohio 4 14 72 2.22 7.72 11.65 9.93
Oklahoma 18 784 1.38 7.38 10.85 17.35
Oregon 14 11 13 15 1.56 6.57 8.66 12.88
Pennsylvania 45 48 29 26 0.54 4.69 6.24 30.56
Rhode Island 35 31 38 36 0.83 3.77 5.30 14.12
South Carolina 51 44 39 49 0.31 3.64 3.61 43.15
South Dakota 43 41 40 38 0.57 3.52 5.12 20.51
Tennessee 111 3 2.60 10.28 10.96 11.82
Texas 49 28 36 37 0.43 4.03 5.14 33.30
Utah 20 10 3 14 1.37 9.03 8.70 22.43
Virginia 17 19 23 32 1.48 5.31 5.90 10.38
Vermont 50 50 49 48 0.34 2.60 4.08 26.42
Washington 15 20 19 21 1.52 6.08 7.34 11.98
Washington, D.C. 32 42 43 44 0.87 3.41 4.33 11.68
Wisconsin 31 32 27 22 0.92 4.85 6.76 17.08
West Virginia 37 36 18 8 0.74 6.23 9.62 29.68
Wyoming 34 21 28 25 0.83 4.78 6.25 18.94
State average 1.18 5.34 6.93 16.72
Rank Bankruptcies per 1,000 personsstate to have a filing rate greater than 10 per 1,000
persons (1 percent). By 2005, however, Arkansas,
Indiana, and Tennessee all had filing rates greater
than 10 per 1,000 persons. Over the 25-year period,
bankruptcyfilingratesinMissouriand Mississippi
have been the closest to the U.S. state average.
The final column in Table 3 contains the
average annual growth rate in bankruptcy filings
from 1980 to 2004. The year 2005 was not con-
sidered in the calculation because of the unusually
high number of filings in that year, due to the
2005 Bankruptcy Act. South Carolina experienced
the greatest average annual growth in bankruptcy
filings, 43 percent, while California’s average
annual growth rate of 4 percent was the lowest in
the country. Although Eighth District states have
bankruptcy filing rates that are greater than the
U.S. state average, average annual growth rates in
six of the seven Eighth District states have been
lower than the U.S. state average growth rate (16.7
percent). Arkansas experienced an average annual
growth rate of 31.2 percent from 1980 to 2004, a
rate nearly double that of the U.S. state average
growth rate. Illinois, Kentucky, and Tennessee
had the lowest bankruptcy growth rates of the
Eighth District states (7.7 percent, 9.74 percent,
and 11.8 percent, respectively).
A visual comparison of bankruptcy filings
with average annual growth rates reveals that
states with higher levels of bankruptcy filings
appear to have had lower average annual bank-
ruptcy growth rates. To explore whether this possi-
bility has statistical validity, a simple regression
model was estimated to examine the relationship
between bankruptcy filings rates in 1980 and the
average annual bankruptcy growth rate from 1980
to 2004.26 The results reveal a negative and statisti-
cally significant relationship between initial filing
rates (1980) and average annual bankruptcy growth
rates. Bankruptcy filings are thus converging—
states that had a lower level of bankruptcy in
1980 had higher average annual growth in bank-
ruptcy filings between 1980 and 2004. The point
estimate from the regression model reveals that
for an increase of 1 filing per 1,000 persons in
1980, the average annual bankruptcy growth rate
in a state was lower by 8.6 percentage points.
There are two possible explanations for con-
verging bankruptcy filings. First, there are seg-
ments of each state’s population that are more
likely to file (e.g., lower-middle income) than
other segments. Assuming the relative size of each
population segment remains constant over time,
there is then an upper limit on the number of
people likely to file for bankruptcy. States having
higher initial bankruptcy filing rates were closer
to this upper limit, and thus the number of filings
in these states has grown much less than in states
having a larger segment of the population yet to
file in the initial year.
Second, numerous studies have demonstrated
the convergence of state income over time (Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Carlino and Mills, 1996;
and Webber, White, and Allen, 2005).27 Because
state bankruptcy rates and per capita income are
negatively correlated (correlation in 2004 =
–0.453), states having a higher initial level of
bankruptcy filings would have had lower income.
If incomes are converging as suggested by the
literature, then lower-income states would have
experienced greater income growth than higher-
income states, and thus the growth in bankruptcy
filings in these lower-income states would have
been lower.
Analysis of Counties in Eighth District
States
Among Eighth District states, the counties with
the 15 highest and 15 lowest bankruptcy filing
rates for 2003 are shown in Table 4, along with
county per capita personal income. There are 681
counties in Eighth District states, with an average
Garrett
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26 The average annual percentage change in bankruptcy filing rates
from 1980 to 2004 was regressed on bankruptcy filing rates in 1980
and a constant term. The coefficient on 1980 filings was –0.0855
and had a t-statistic of 5.91. The regression R2 was 0.42.
27 The standard model of income convergence has been criticized for
several reasons. Quah (1993) notes that implicit in the empirical
specification is the idea that each economy has a steady-state growth
path that follows a time trend. Durlauf (2001) points to several
problems inherent in traditional convergence models, such as the
potential for spillover effects and nonlinearities, a disconnect
between growth theory and empirical modeling, and heterogeneous
parameters. For purposes in this paper, however, differences across
states in terms of heterogeneous parameters and different growth
paths are likely to be significantly less than across countries because
political systems and components of government revenue and
spending are much more similar across states than across countries.Garrett
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Table 4
County Bankruptcies in Eighth District States: 15 Highest and 15 Lowest, 2003
County State Bankruptcies per 1,000 persons Per capita income ($)
15 highest counties
Shelby Tennessee 20.85 34,087
Marshall Mississippi 16.52 19,224
Haywood Tennessee 15.82 21,792
Lauderdale Tennessee 14.58 18,985
Crittenden Arkansas 13.99 22,266
Hardeman Tennessee 13.77 18,884
Jefferson Arkansas 13.56 22,451
Tipton Tennessee 13.36 23,787
Rhea Tennessee 13.33 21,097
Tunica Mississippi 13.24 19,325
Dyer Tennessee 13.21 25,047
DeSoto Mississippi 13.15 28,713
Gallatin Kentucky 12.84 21,642
Marion Indiana 12.76 33,449
Gibson Tennessee 12.61 24,629
15 lowest counties
Nodaway Missouri 2.76 20,914
Putnam Missouri 2.72 19,304
Scotland Missouri 2.65 21,113
Texas Missouri 2.58 17,107
Calhoun Illinois 2.54 22,675
Elliott Kentucky 2.47 14,633
Shannon Missouri 2.40 17,191
Reynolds Missouri 2.28 19,337
Sullivan Missouri 2.27 20,855
Moore Tennessee 2.02 23,166
Oregon Missouri 1.93 17,523
Chariton Missouri 1.46 24,087
Worth Missouri 1.30 19,559
Issaquena Mississippi 0.97 15,833
NOTE: There are 681 counties in Eighth District states. All data are from 2003.filing rate of 7 per 1,000 persons. The majority of
the counties with the highest bankruptcy filing
rates in Eighth District states are located in
Tennessee (eight counties). Two counties are in
Arkansas, three in Mississippi, and one each in
Kentucky and Indiana. Missouri and Illinois had
no counties with bankruptcy filing rates in the top
15. The average filing rate in the top 15 counties
was 14.2 per 1,000 persons. In Eighth District
states, 10 of the 15 lowest-ranked counties are
located in Missouri. The filing rate in each of the
lowest 15 counties is about one-seventh that of the
top 15 counties, with the lowest 15 counties hav-
ing an average filing rate of 2.0 per 1,000 persons.
Table 5 presents 2003 data on county bank-
ruptcy filings for each of the Eighth District states
along with county per capita income. County
rankings within each Eighth District state as well
as for all counties in Eighth District states are also
shown. The data in Table 5 reveal large differences
in county bankruptcy filing rates within states as
well as across states. In most cases, the five high-
est bankruptcy counties in each state had filing
rates roughly three to four times that of the low-
est bankruptcy counties in the state. Although fil-
ing rates in the bottom five counties of each state
are similar, there is quite a large difference in the
filing rates of the top five counties in each state.
For example, St. Louis City (an independent
jurisdiction) in Missouri had the highest bank-
ruptcy filing rate in the state (9.54 per 1,000), but
this rate was the lowest of all top counties in other
states. Also, Shelby County had the highest filing
rate (nearly 21 per 1,000 persons) in Tennessee;
but the county with the highest filing rate in
Illinois is Knox County, with a rate of 10.5 per
1,000 persons, or nearly half that of the Shelby
County rate. (See boxed insert.).
The data in Table 4 reveal that county per
capita income is higher for the 15 highest bank-
ruptcy counties in Eighth District states than for
the lowest 15 bankruptcy counties. Average county
per capita income for the top 15 counties is
$23,692, and average county per capita income
for the bottom 15 counties is $19,521.28 Notice
also that Issaquena County in Mississippi had
the lowest per capita income in the sample, but
it also had the lowest bankruptcy filing rate: less
than 1 per 1,000 persons. This visual positive
relationship between per capita income and
bankruptcy filings lends support to the findings
of past research on bankruptcy filings that the
Garrett
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28 These averages are statistically different (t-statistic = 3.25).
SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE
What is most interesting about Shelby County is that its demographics and economics suggest
the bankruptcy rate should be much lower—per capita income in Shelby County is relatively
high (about $34,000), home prices are rising, unemployment is low, and consumer loan losses
are not the worst in the nation (see SMR Research Corporation, “Bankruptcy Data by County,”
Hackettstown, NJ, available at www.smrresearch.com/cntybkrprospectus.pdf). So why is bank-
ruptcy in Shelby County so high? This remains a mystery, but there are several possibilities. First,
county-level data is an average of all sub-jurisdictions. Detailed research at the zip code or Census
tract level might reveal several pockets of extremely high bankruptcy filing rates dispersed through-
out the county. Thus, several small areas might be driving the Shelby County results. Second,
various community and business leaders in the Memphis area have remarked that Shelby County
has an unusually high number of bankruptcy attorneys, thus suggesting more filings. But, the
direction of causality is unknown. That is, do more attorneys cause more filings, or are there more
attorneys because filings are higher? Third, it is possible that, for whatever reason, the social stigma
associated with bankruptcy filings in Shelby County has always been low.Garrett
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Table 5
County Bankruptcy Statistics in Eighth District States, 2003
Bankruptcies
County State rank Eighth District rank per 1,000 persons Per capita income ($)
Arkansas
Highest 5 counties
Crittenden 15 13.99 22,266
Jefferson 27 13.56 22,451
Arkansas 3 16 12.51 26,489
Pulaski 4 18 12.17 33,620
Mississippi 5 21 12.04 21,738
Lowest 5 counties
Marion 71 599 4.50 18,579
Searcy 72 613 4.26 16,793
Fulton 73 621 4.12 18,485
Newton 74 662 3.02 16,765
Sevier 75 663 3.02 19,926
Illinois
Highest 5 counties
Knox 1 47 10.53 24,382
Vermilion 2 52 10.45 23,283
Winnebago 3 53 10.45 27,051
Franklin 4 59 10.35 21,599
Marion 5 85 9.64 23,920
Lowest 5 counties
DuPage 98 641 3.64 44,739
Woodford 99 647 3.49 28,585
Pope 100 648 3.47 19,325
Jo Daviess 101 667 2.84 30,401
Calhoun 102 672 2.54 22,675
Indiana
Highest 5 counties
Marion 1 14 12.76 33,449
Jennings 2 30 11.33 22,910
Scott 3 31 11.24 22,145
Madison 4 33 11.16 27,207
Jackson 5 37 11.01 25,476
Lowest 5 counties
Monroe 88 558 5.04 25,162
Lagrange 89 596 4.55 20,668
Dubois 90 605 4.44 32,448
Adams 91 612 4.27 24,114
Daviess 92 619 4.13 24,088
Kentucky
Highest 5 counties
Gallatin 1 13 12.84 21,642
Hopkins 2 20 12.07 23,368
Grant 3 35 11.10 21,468
Simpson 4 41 10.81 24,146
Muhlenberg 5 71 10.15 20,658
Lowest 5 counties
Wayne 116 642 3.60 17,748
Clay 117 653 3.34 14,874
Green 118 655 3.31 18,257
Washington 119 666 2.84 21,708
Elliott 120 673 2.47 14,633Garrett
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Table 5, cont’d
Bankruptcies
County State rank Eighth District rank per 1,000 persons Per capita income ($)
Missouri
Highest 5 counties
St. Louis City 1 93 9.54 27,236
Callaway 2 117 9.02 21,562
St. Louis 3 144 8.61 43,766
Jackson 4 221 7.91 31,966
Madison 5 257 7.63 19,309
Lowest 5 counties
Reynolds 111 675 2.28 19,337
Sullivan 112 676 2.27 20,855
Oregon 113 678 1.93 17,523
Chariton 114 679 1.46 24,087
Worth 115 680 1.30 19,559
Mississippi
Highest 5 counties
Marshall 12 16.52 19,224
Tunica 2 10 13.24 19,325
DeSoto 3 12 13.15 28,713
Clay 4 17 12.22 21,241
Tate 5 23 11.91 22,818
Lowest 5 counties
Kemper 78 601 4.48 17,711
Neshoba 79 624 4.05 25,687
Wayne 80 629 4.01 18,926
Smith 81 633 3.85 22,783
Issaquena 82 681 0.97 15,833
Tennessee
Highest 5 counties
Shelby 11 20.85 34,087
Haywood 23 15.82 21,792
Lauderdale 34 14.58 18,985
Hardeman 46 13.77 18,884
Tipton 58 13.36 23,787
Lowest 5 counties
Hancock 91 623 4.06 14,610
Williamson 92 635 3.77 42,694
Clay 93 645 3.52 19,576
Van Buren 94 656 3.28 21,530
Moore 95 677 2.02 23,166
NOTE: There are a total of 681 counties in Eighth District states. All data above are for 2003.majority of bankruptcy filers are not lower income.
However, this research has also established that
filings are highest for individuals of lower-middle
income—something that cannot be discerned
from the raw data in Table 4.
County Income and Bankruptcy
A scatter plot of 2003 county per capita
income and bankruptcy filing rates for all 681
counties in Eighth District states is shown in
Figure 5.29 Included in this scatter plot is a regres-
sion line obtained from regressing bankruptcies
per 1,000 persons on a constant, per capita
income, and the square of per capita income. The
relationship between county bankruptcy filings
rates and income, at least in Eighth District states,
is nonlinear—bankruptcy filing rates increase
with income up to a certain income level, then
filing rates decrease with further increases in
county per capita income.30
Figure 5 reveals that middle and lower-middle
income counties have the highest filing rates, and
bankruptcy filing rates for the highest income
counties are very similar to the filing rates for the
lowest income counties. This is likely reflective
of the fact that the poorest of the poor cannot
acquire credit or other assets, thus there is no
chance of accumulating too much debt that filing
for bankruptcy may alleviate. Wealthier individ-
uals, on the other hand, have greater incomes and
more financial diversification that shield them
from negative income shocks, and their higher
levels of education make it more likely they better
understand the risks of acquiring debt, are less
likely to do so, and are thus less likely to file for
bankruptcy.
In addition to the full sample of counties, the
same regression was estimated for each of the
Eighth District states. These results, along with
the coefficients from the full sample regression,
are shown in the first two data columns of Table 6.
In general, there appears to be a similar nonlinear
relationship between county income and county
bankruptcy filings within each Eighth District
state (as seen by the positive coefficient on income
and the negative coefficient on the square of
income). However, not all income coefficients
are statistically significant.31
29 The regression line is almost identical if Shelby County, Tennessee,
is removed from the sample.
30 The results are very similar when median county household
income is used rather than per capita personal income. These
results will be provided upon request.
Garrett
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Figure 5
Eighth District Counties: Per Capita Income and Personal Bankruptcy Filings, 2003
31 The adjusted R2 from each regression is also relatively low. The
inclusion of other (possibly) relevant variables proved difficult at
the county level, given that debt and savings figures are not readily
available at this level of disaggregation. In addition, many demo-
graphic variables, such as ethnicity and population density, are
commonly correlated with income.Garrett
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Table 6
County Bankruptcy and Income
Per capita income Percent in poverty
State Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Variable Coefficient t-Statistic
Arkansas Constant –11.233 1.31 Constant 10.909*** 2.71
Income 0.0014* 1.85 Poverty –0.419 1.01
Income2 –0.216e–7 1.41 Poverty2 0.0138 1.35
Adjusted R2 0.205 Adjusted R2 0.026
H0: β2 = β3 = 0 10.53*** H0: β2 = β3 = 0 1.99
Illinois Constant –0.203 0.07 Constant 3.715*** 3.32
Income 0.00052*** 2.70 Poverty 0.378** 2.12
Income2 –0.967e–8*** 3.33 Poverty2 –0.0095 1.44
Adjusted R2 0.051 Adjusted R2 0.064
H0: β2 = β3 = 0 3.73** H0: β2 = β3 = 0 4.45**
Indiana Constant 0.732 0.14 Constant 2.914 1.29
Income 0.00051 1.45 Poverty 1.011** 2.01
Income2 –0.897e–8 1.55 Poverty2 –0.0479* 1.74
Adjusted R2 –0.006 Adjusted R2 0.026
H0: β2 = β3 = 0 0.69 H0: β2 = β3 = 0 2.22
Kentucky Constant –5.283 1.62 Constant 7.256*** 5.11
Income 0.00093*** 3.22 Poverty 0.0552 0.34
Income2 –0.170e–7*** 2.76 Poverty2 –0.0051 1.16
Adjusted R2 0.144 Adjusted R2 0.147
H0: β2 = β3 = 0 11.00*** H0: β2 = β3 = 0 11.23***
Missouri Constant –1.174 0.57 Constant 8.343*** 5.49
Income 0.00034** 2.22 Poverty –0.426* 1.77
Income2 –0.318e–8 1.14 Poverty2 0.012 1.29
Adjusted R2 0.191 Adjusted R2 0.047
H0: β2 = β3 = 0 14.47*** H0: β2 = β3 = 0 3.84**
Mississippi Constant –1.670 0.39 Constant 9.769** 2.15
Income 0.00075** 2.17 Poverty –0.135 0.31
Income2 –0.142e–7** 2.10 Poverty2 0.0014 0.14
Adjusted R2 0.016 Adjusted R2 0.0003
H0: β2 = β3 = 0 1.66 H0: β2 = β3 = 0 1.01
Tennessee Constant –4.090 0.88 Constant 1.577 0.49
Income 0.00089** 2.37 Poverty 0.931** 2.14
Income2 –0.145e–7* 1.91 Poverty2 –0.031** 2.14
Adjusted R2 0.052 Adjusted R2 0.020
H0: β2 = β3 = 0 3.55** H0: β2 = β3 = 0 1.96
Eighth District Constant –1.813 1.33 Constant 6.056*** 11.00
Income 0.00064*** 6.00 Poverty 0.135* 1.86
Income2 –0.108e–7*** 5.19 Poverty2 –0.0042* 1.93
Adjusted R2 0.051 Adjusted R2 0.001
H0: β2 = β3 = 0 19.29*** H0: β2 = β3 = 0 1.48
NOTE: The dependent variable is bankruptcies per 1,000 persons. Sample sizes: AR = 75, Il = 102, IN = 92, KY = 120, MO = 115, MS = 82,
TN = 95, Eighth District = 681. F-statistic presented for tests of joint significance. */**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1 percent levels.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.The empirical results shown in Table 6 can
be used to determine the level of county per capita
income for which bankruptcy filings are the
highest.32 With this information, the number of
counties in each state that are above and below
this maximum value can be computed. For the
full sample of Eighth District states and each
individual Eighth District state, the level of county
per capita income that maximizes personal bank-
ruptcy filings and the number of counties above
and below this value are shown in Table 7.33
For all Eighth District states, the level of
county per capita income that maximizes bank-
ruptcy filings is relatively high, as can be seen by
the fact that all bankruptcy-maximizing income
values are above the average county per capita
income. What this reveals is that there is gener-
ally a positive relationship between county per
capita income and bankruptcy filings for all but
the wealthiest counties in each state; and, for the
wealthiest counties, the relationship between per
capita income and bankruptcy filings is negative.
It is interesting to note that this relationship holds,
in general, for states having relatively significant
differences in per capita income.
Per capita income provides a measure of
average county income and thus does not provide
any insights into the distribution of income. The
previous analysis of county bankruptcy filings
using per capita county income is therefore redone
using the percent of the population below poverty.
For each state in the Eighth District as well as the
full sample of counties, county bankruptcies per
1,000 persons in 2003 is regressed on the percent
of the population in poverty in 2003 and this per-
cent squared. Conducting such an analysis pro-
vides insights into how county bankruptcy filings
32 Using the estimates from each state and the full sample shown in
Table 6, the level of per capita income that maximizes personal
bankruptcy rates is found by differentiating bankruptcy filings
with respect to income, setting this expression equal to zero, and
solving for income. The second derivatives are negative, thus con-
firming a maximum.
33 Several caveats are worth mentioning. First, the values in Table 7
are based solely on the estimates shown in Table 6 and not the
statistical significance of these estimates. Second, although county
data is much more disaggregated than state or national data, it is
still relatively aggregate data. The analysis here attempts to make
inferences about individual level behavior using county-level data.
Similarly, county boundaries are political boundaries, not neces-
sarily economic boundaries; that is, local economic conditions are
not contained within county boundaries. Third, counties in Eighth
District states are only a subsample of all U.S. counties, and counties
in Eighth District states have per capita income below U.S. per
capita income. For example, in 2003, U.S. per capita income was
$31,484; in Eighth District states it was $23,197. Thus, the sample
of counties used here was of relatively poorer counties compared
with the U.S. average.
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Table 7
County Income and Bankruptcy Filings
Level of per capita Number of Number of
county income counties below counties above Average
that maximizes maximizing maximizing county per capita
State bankruptcy filings ($) income level income level income, 2003 ($)
Arkansas 31,692 74 1 21,452
Illinois 26,901 74 28 25,335
Indiana* 28,726 72 20 26,137
Kentucky 27,327 104 16 22,040
Missouri 53,572 115 0 22,846
Mississippi 26,442 75 7 20,870
Tennessee 30,434 89 6 23,330
Eight District 29,698 631 50 23,197
NOTE: The above values are estimated using the coefficient estimates from a regression of county bankruptcy filing rates on income
and income squared. See Table 6 for coefficient estimates. *For Indiana, the slope coefficients (see Table 6) used to compute maximum
income are neither individually significant nor jointly significant at conventional levels.differ across counties with different percentages
of their populations below the poverty level.34
The empirical results from the regression
models are also shown in Table 7. The results are
statistically weaker than the results from the per
capita income models, but there is some evidence
of a similar relationship with bankruptcy filings.
That is, bankruptcy filings generally increase with
poverty, but at a decreasing rate. A rationale for
this finding is the same as that for the per capita
income results—namely, that the poorest individ-
uals cannot acquire credit or other assets and thus
gain little or nothing by filing for bankruptcy
because no assets are held. Note, however, the
estimated poverty coefficients for Missouri (sta-
tistically significant) and Arkansas (not statisti-
cally significant) suggest that, in those states,
county bankruptcies decrease as the percent of
the population in poverty increases, but at a
decreasing rate.
The results from the full sample of counties
reveal that bankruptcy filings increase with
poverty at a decreasing rate, although the two
poverty coefficients are not jointly significant at
conventional levels. The level of poverty that
maximizes filings for the full sample is 16.2 per-
cent. Of the 681 counties in Eighth District states,
208 counties (about 31 percent) had poverty levels
greater than 16.2 percent. As cautioned earlier,
however, the poverty results are generally less
robust across the sample of states and, thus, con-
clusions are less definitive than those obtained
from the per capita income models.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The rapid rise in bankruptcy filings can be
attributed to numerous economic and institutional
factors. Increased consumer debt as a percentage
of income, decreased savings, and widespread
credit card availability and usage have all made
individuals more vulnerable than in the past.
Consumers today face an increased probability
of bankruptcy when hit with negative income
shocks, such as divorce, job loss, and medical
expenses. Legal changes have also contributed to
the rise in bankruptcy by making it less costly (or
more attractive) for individuals to file for bank-
ruptcy. Greater access to credit by lower and
middle income households that may not have
adequate financial education is another cited
factor. Finally, there has been a decrease in the
social stigma associated with filing for bankruptcy.
The analyses presented in this article reveal
some interesting insights into bankruptcy filing
rates. At the national level, filing rates are 14.9
percentage points higher during the first quarter
of a recession compared with non-recession quar-
ters. However, bankruptcy filing rates are 9.2 per-
centage points lower in the second quarter of a
recession compared with non-recession quarters.
The net effect of the first quarter and second
quarter of a recession are not statistically different,
however, thus suggesting that a recession has no
net effect on bankruptcy filing rates. Recessions
appears to cause, at least as indicated in national-
level data, a so-called housecleaning effect on
bankruptcy filings. However, despite the short-run
shocks to bankruptcy filings from recessions, the
upward trend in bankruptcy filings has continued.
Personal bankruptcy rates are quite different
across states, especially those states in the Eighth
Federal Reserve District. These states, as a whole,
have a filing rate that is greater than the U.S.
average filing rate. An analysis of state-level bank-
ruptcy filings revealed that states with higher
levels of bankruptcy filings in 1980 experienced
slower annual bankruptcy growth rates through
2004. There thus appears to be convergence in
state bankruptcy filings.
An analysis of bankruptcy filing rates and
income in those counties located in Eighth District
states revealed a nonlinear relationship between
the two variables. Bankruptcy filings were found
to increase with county income, but only to a
certain point. After a certain income level, it was
found that bankruptcy filings decrease with
income. It was shown that for most states in the
Eighth District, the bulk of each state’s counties
had a level of per capita income that was below
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34 Models were also estimated that included both income variables
and both poverty variables. Some of the results were quite different
from those presented in Table 6. This is likely the result of a high
degree of colinearity between per capita income and the percent
of the population below the poverty level (average ρ = 0.65). These
results will be provided upon request.the bankruptcy-maximizing level. Thus, for most
counties in Eighth District states, bankruptcy filing
rates increase with county income. This nonlinear
relationship between income and bankruptcy
filings reflects the fact that those individuals
with the lowest incomes are likely to have few
assets and limited access to credit, thus making
it unlikely that they could incur debt, default,
and file for bankruptcy. Empirical evidence also
revealed a nonlinear relationship between county
bankruptcy filings and the percent of the county
population in poverty, but this relationship was
statistically weaker than the relationship between
per capita income and personal bankruptcy filings.
However, the overall finding that personal bank-
ruptcies increase with income at a decreasing rate
within counties located in Eighth District states
is supportive of earlier research that suggests that
individuals with lower-middle incomes are more
likely to file for bankruptcy than individuals of
other income groups.
Financial education is likely the key to revers-
ing the decreasing social stigma associated with
bankruptcy and thus reducing the demand for
personal bankruptcies. Community groups and
educators are best to decide how this is achieved.
Even a strong public mission of financial educa-
tion will not eliminate all bankruptcies, however,
and that is why bankruptcy laws still need to be
in place. Some individuals will have no choice
but to file for bankruptcy despite responsible
financial management.
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